Overview
The ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have identified a 2015 deadline to establish an ASEAN Single Aviation Market (ASAM) for the liberalization of air transport services in the region. Also referred to as the "ASEAN Open Skies" policy, the aim is to have the ASAM in place by the time the proposed ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) takes effect in 2015.
An "open skies" proposal for the region has been discussed since the 1990s (Findlay and Forsyth, 1992) . The proposal was subsequently included as an area of cooperation in the so-called "Plan of Action for Transport and Communications (1994-1996) ". At that time, a Framework Agreement on Services (FAS) had been adopted to liberalize trade in services beyond the commitments undertaken in the World Trade Organization's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
Subsequently, the discussions took place in the larger context of greater economic integration across all sectors through the harmonization of trade and investment policies. To that end, air travel became one of the 12 designated priority sectors for economic integration, all of which are key components for the proposed AEC.
Over the years, the concept of progressive liberalization of air transport services has been reaffirmed at successive high-level fora, particularly at the annual ASEAN (ii) for scheduled passenger services,
• unlimited third and fourth freedom flights for all designated points within ASEAN sub-regions by 2005, and for at least two designated points in each country between the ASEAN sub-regions by 2006;
• unlimited fifth freedom traffic between designated points within the ASEAN sub-regions by 2006 and at least two designated points in each country between the ASEAN sub-regions by 2008;
• unlimited third and fourth freedom flights between the capital cities by 2008;
• unlimited fifth freedom flights for the capital cities by 2010.
In the meantime, several "early mover" member states had gone ahead to adopt limited agreements among themselves to relax market access restrictions. At this juncture, it is critical to appreciate what exactly the various "freedoms"
entail. In aviation nomenclature, commercial flights by airlines are negotiated by states in the form of so-called "freedoms". To take an example, a Singapore carrier flying between Singapore and Bangkok, Thailand would require the "first freedom"
to overfly Malaysian airspace and the "second freedom" to stop in Malaysia for fuel and supplies, if necessary. Both these "freedoms" are granted by Malaysia to Singapore (and reciprocally by Singapore to Malaysia for the latter's carriers) in bilateral negotiations between both governments.
The actual commercial opportunities are covered by the subsequent "freedoms".
Expanding on the above example, the Singapore carrier has rights to carry passengers, cargo and baggage for profit from Singapore to Bangkok utilising the "third freedom" granted by Thailand to Singapore. The reverse journey back to Singapore with the same rights would constitute the "fourth freedom". In both directions, the carrier may have the right to stop over in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to drop off some passengers and fill up the vacated seats with new passengers picked up from there. This is the "fifth freedom" granted to Singapore by both Thailand and Malaysia, allowing Singapore carriers to carry traffic for profit between them. All these "freedoms" or rights are granted by states to each other through bilateral negotiations, often with flight and capacity limits. It is then up to the individual states to designate which of their carriers would enjoy these specific rights. Liberalization of Air Freight Services (MAFLAFS). The MAFLAFS will be analysed at the end of this paper. For now, the focus is on the provision of passenger air services.
MAAS, MAFLPAS and Market Access Liberalization
The MAAS and MAFLPAS and their Implementing Protocols spell out the RIATS liberalizing targets in phased stages. To begin with, MAAS and MAFLPAS provide that each contracting state party will provide the designated airlines of the other contracting parties the right to fly across its territory without landing (the "first freedom") and the right to make stops in its territory for non-traffic purposes (the "second freedom").
The Implementing Protocols of MAAS then proceed to lay out the following "third", "fourth" and "fifth" freedom market access rights: On their part, the Implementing Protocols of MAFLPAS address the following "third", "fourth" and "fifth" freedom market access rights: The first four Implementing Protocols of MAAS -Protocols 1 to 4 -are limited in impact and relatively straightforward. This is because they only deal with market access relaxations designed to spur growth within sub-regions straddling the boundary regions of member states (Forsyth, et al., 2006) . Four such sub-regions have so far been identified (new sub-regions may be declared or existing ones expanded): the Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), the Sub-regional Cooperation in Air Transport among Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV), the Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) and the Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT).
The four sub-regions and their respective designated points are listed in Table 1 below, while Table 2 lists the cities designated under Protocols 5 and 6. The idea of relaxing market access rights within and between sub-regions demonstrates ASEAN's incrementalist philosophy of starting with modest goals first and pursuing more ambitious relaxations at a later stage. As noted above, RIATS had earlier laid down specific deadlines for achieving the sub-regional relaxations.
MAAS Protocols 1 to 4 reaffirm these substantive commitments. It should be noted, though, that by the time MAAS and its Implementing Protocols were adopted in May 2009, the deadlines first identified by RIATS had all expired (with the exception of unlimited fifth freedom for capital cities slated for 2010). There was thus a delay in formalizing the RIATS commitments into binding legal agreements.
In any event, MAAS Protocol 1 provides that designated airlines from each contracting party shall be allowed to operate unlimited third and fourth freedom passenger services from any designated points in its territory to any designated points in the sub-region to which it belongs. The Protocol lists the designated cities by Table 3 Naturally, such a "pick and choose" policy is inconsistent with the ASEAN multilateral agreements and the overall integration aims of ASAM.
The offer of the five major cities for liberalization is, in itself, to be welcomed.
Even if falling short of full relaxations, it will effectively open up a sizeable amount of the international market into and out of Indonesia, given that the five cities (particularly the capital, Jakarta) account for the bulk of international traffic into the country. At the same time, there has been no indication from Indonesia that it will accept MAAS Protocol 5 that provides for unlimited third and fourth freedom capacity between capital cities.
The reality is that some airline quarters in Indonesia remain resistant to offering full and unlimited access into Jakarta, especially for Singapore, Malaysian and Thai carriers. This is consistent with the "partial" or selective open skies policy advocated by INACA. In large part, the concern revolves around the "sixth freedom"
operations of foreign airlines, particularly those from Singapore and Malaysia. The "sixth freedom" is actually a simple combination of a "fourth freedom" (e.g. a Singapore carrier's Jakarta-Singapore operation) with a connecting "third freedom" operation (from Singapore to anywhere else). This is the familiar operating model of major "sixth freedom" carriers worldwide such as Singapore Airlines, Emirates, KLM, Korean Air, Turkish Airlines and Qatar Airways. In essence, "sixth freedom"
hub operations depend simply on two factors -a geographically strategic "hub" airport in the centre of airline routes to serve as a transit stop, and unlimited third/fourth freedom rights to operate numerous "spokes" (hence, the alternative nomenclature of "hub-and-spokes" to describe the "sixth freedom").
Due to the Indonesian carriers' relatively limited international operations, most travellers from Europe, North America and Northeast Asia travel into and out of Indonesia on foreign carriers' sixth freedom operations. The largest operator in this regard is Singapore Airlines, which channels these travellers through its hub, Singapore Changi Airport. In recent years, the highly successful Malaysian low-cost carrier AirAsia has also begun to transport the budget-minded segment of travellers in this same manner through its hub at Kuala Lumpur International Airport. The discomfort with such sixth freedom operations accounts for Indonesia's reluctance to accept the ASEAN agreements, particularly MAAS Protocol 5 that opens up unlimited third and fourth freedom access into and out of Jakarta. Since third and fourth freedom flights form the backbone of sixth freedom operations, staying out of MAAS Protocol 5 is a strategy to restrict rival carriers' sixth freedom operations into and out of Jakarta.
For the Indonesian carriers, Jakarta itself is too big a prize to give up even if it constitutes only one point in the sprawling archipelago. Indeed, Jakarta accounts for the bulk of the Indonesian economy and is the principal gateway into the country.
Opening up other points would also allow foreign carriers to bypass the main hubs such as Jakarta and to carry unlimited traffic directly into secondary points such as Bali, Surabaya, Medan and Lombok. This will affect the domestic business of Garuda and other local airlines that thrive on domestic connecting traffic. This explains their resistance MAFLPAS, the agreement that opens up the secondary cities.
In short, to protect themselves from foreign competition, Garuda and the other Indonesian carriers continue to lobby their government aggressively to steer clear of the ASEAN multilateral agreements. This has the effect of restricting the other ASEAN carriers' operations into Indonesia, subjecting them to finite capacity that remains negotiated bilaterally. With Indonesia being home to half the entire ASEAN population, its decision to stay out of the ASEAN agreements hampers the ASAM project significantly. In the process, the travelling public is denied benefits such as increased competition and lower fares, and Indonesia's connectivity to the region and the outside world remains relatively poor.
The lobbying influence of the airlines must, however, be contrasted with the position of other stakeholders in the Indonesian economy. As might be expected, sectors such as the tourism industry greatly welcome the economic advantages that liberalization might bring. Indeed, the benefits of air services liberalization for the overall Indonesian economy are obvious -greater choice and lower fares for the travelling public, increased business and tourist arrivals, and positive overall effects for export-oriented businesses, inward foreign investment, airport and ancillary services and indeed, the entire economy.
In recent years, several provincial governments have emerged as keen lobbyists to champions direct flights by foreign airlines into their cities. These provincial authorities recognize that tourism and foreign investment could grow faster if there were greater direct connectivity to key regional cities. Recent economic studies commissioned by the Indonesian central government have also identified benefits of around 6 trillion Rupiah (US$650 million) in additional GDP that could potentially accrue to the overall economy if an "open skies" policy were adopted by 2025 (IndII, 2012). As such, the aero-political landscape in Indonesia is highly complex: it would be inaccurate to assume that efforts to liberalize the air transport industry are resisted by all the major stakeholders in Indonesia.
For now, though, the airline industry clearly has the upper hand in lobbying the government to continue protecting its interests. Hence, Indonesia remains opposed to ratifying MAAS Protocols 5 and 6 and MAFLPAS Protocols 1 and 2. As a result, efforts to relax market access into Indonesia have had to be dealt with in a strictly bilateral manner. For instance, up till early 2013, Singapore carriers' capacity entitlement between Singapore and Indonesia (especially Jakarta) had come close to being exhausted. In January 2013, both sides agreed to increase capacity on the main routes between Singapore and Jakarta as well as Surabaya, Bali and Medan. The
Indonesian government had agreed to such reciprocal but incremental additions only after capacity on the Indonesian side had itself come close to being reached. This followed the requests of several Indonesian carriers, particularly low-cost operators such as Lion Air and Indonesia AirAsia, to expand operations into Singapore. In turn, the reciprocal adjustments have allowed Singapore Airlines and Singaporebased low-cost carriers such as Tiger Airways and Jetstar Asia to increase their operations to Indonesia, including Jakarta. However, the overall capacity remains finite, strictly governed by the bilateral agreement between both sides.
In comparison, the Philippine government has a slightly different perspective.
The While the Philippine government's concern over congestion at Ninoy Aquino International is understandable, there is much force in the argument that traffic rights and airport slots are separate matters. As such, the lack of slots at an airport should not prevent member states from ratifying the ASEAN agreements to liberalize market access rights and to signal support for ASEAN's market integration commitments. Linking slots to access rights is also a negative precedent in that it encourages governments to use congestion and lack of slots as excuses to delay their adherence to regional commitments. With ASEAN, however, the MAAS and MAFLPAS multilateral agreements do not even address seventh freedom operations since the member states have not achieved consensus on the issue. In fact, the seventh freedom is not even on the negotiating table as a future agenda item. Similarly, the ASEAN agreements do not free up domestic or "cabotage" operations. These are also known in the industry as the "eighth freedom" (if the flight originates in the carrier's home country, e.g. a
Seventh Freedom and Domestic
Singapore carrier operating Singapore-Jakarta-Bali) and the "ninth freedom" (the same carrier operating between Jakarta and Bali without starting or ending in Singapore (at least on paper) majority-owned and effectively controlled by local interests.
Thus, AirAsia owns only minority stakes (less than 50%) in each of these entities.
The result is that AirAsia Thailand flies between Bangkok and Singapore as a Thai carrier, exercising simple third/fourth freedom rights belonging to Thailand, and not 
Ownership and Control Restrictions
The above "circumventions" remain, of course, inconvenient and less than ideal. This is because the AirAsia group has to resort to establishing overseas subsidiaries (and accepting only a minority shareholding in each of these) instead of operating in its own right. In other words, the vehicle of setting up subsidiaries with minority shareholding is an imperfect "stop-gap" measure that awaits further liberalization of market access rules to allow full seventh freedom and domestic operations for foreign carriers.
In this regard, market access issues are closely related to ownership and control restrictions. On top of prohibiting seventh freedom and domestic operations by foreign carriers, the current regime also disallows a carrier like AirAsia from going into, say, Indonesia, either to establish a wholly-owned subsidiary or to buy over an existing local airline fully. In comparison, these moves are permitted in the E.U. common aviation market: any E.U. national can move into another E.U. country and establish a fully-owned airline there, and fly it between any two points within the E.U. In essence, both market access and ownership and control are freed up, forming the hallmarks of a true single or common aviation market.
Within ASEAN, however, ownership and control remain highly restricted, just like market access. In most of the bilateral air services agreements between the individual ASEAN states, it is a common condition that carriers designated by the respective governments to enjoy the relevant third, fourth and fifth freedom market access rights must be "substantially owned and effectively controlled" by the designating state and/or its nationals. This means that foreign interests' stakes in a local carrier cannot exceed 49% of shareholding. In some states like the Philippines, the foreign ownership component is even stricter -no foreign interest can own more than 40% of shareholding in a Philippine carrier due to the Constitution's regard for airlines as strategic public utilities.
As explained above, the likes of AirAsia have sought to get around such restrictions by establishing local subsidiaries that are technically separate from the parent carrier. Thus, airlines like Jetstar Asia (Singapore), Jetstar Pacific (Vietnam), Tiger Mandala (Indonesia) and Malindo (Malaysia) are all majority-owned by their respective local owners with the parent airline group owning only a minority stake.
In this sense, they have all scrupulously copied the original AirAsia model and are wholly faithful to the requirement of majority local ownership. These carriers also utilize the operating rights found in the relevant home country's bilateral agreements with other countries.
That said, the requirement of "effective control" is less clear. On the one hand, the CEOs of these subsidiary carriers are typically individuals with local nationality, and their respective boards have majority local representation (Tan, 2009 ). Yet, there is little doubt that managing expertise and strategic decisions do emanate from the parent foreign airline that is the minority owner, particularly because the local majority shareholders typically have no aviation experience. In terms of branding, these overseas subsidiaries share the same logo and marketing identity as their parent carriers'. For instance, the entities in the AirAsia group are effectively marketed to the traveling public as a single airline through advertisements and on a common internet booking platform. As explained earlier, this effectively gives the parent airlines multiple hubs in other countries and allows them to operate what would otherwise be prohibited seventh freedom rights. The only drawback is that the parent airlines have to accept minority ownership in the subsidiaries.
How have the two ASEAN multilateral agreements sought to deal with these ownership and control restrictions? Interestingly, both MAAS and MAFLPAS provide alternatives to the traditional "substantial ownership and effective control"
rule. Specifically, they provide that contracting state parties have the right to designate an unlimited number of carriers to enjoy the relevant rights, provided that they fulfill the following criteria on ownership and control:
(a) substantial ownership and effective control of the airlines are vested in the designating state, its nationals or both (see Article 3(2)(a)(i) of MAAS); or (b) subject to the acceptance of the contracting party receiving the application of a designated airline, the airline is incorporated in and has its principal place of business in the designating state, and is (and remains) substantially owned and effectively controlled by one or more member state and/or its nationals, and the designating state has and maintains effective regulatory control ( see Article 3(2)(a)(ii) of MAAS); or (c) subject to the acceptance of the contracting party receiving the application of a designated airline, the airline is incorporated in and has its principal place of business in the designating state, and the designating state has and maintains effective regulatory control of that airline, provided that such arrangements will not be equivalent to allowing airline(s) or its subsidiaries access to traffic rights not otherwise available to that airline(s) (see Article 3(2)(a)(iii) of MAAS).
The first alternative (Article 3(2)(a)(i)) is the traditional "substantial ownership and effective control" formula that adds nothing new to the existing bilateral requirements. The second (Article 3(2)(a)(ii)) is premised upon an increasingly favoured clause in more progressive bilateral air services agreements worldwide.
This provides for a designated carrier to be incorporated in the designating state and to have its principal place of business in that state. Hence, in terms of shareholding, it would not matter if that carrier is owned in the majority by interests outside the designating state, as long as the seat of incorporation and principal place of doing business remain in the designating state. Such a formulation opens the door for a carrier to attract foreign capital injections beyond the customary 49% limit, and is designed to make local carriers more attractive to foreign investment.
However, the precise formulation in Article 3 (2) Going forward, this will be a major issue for the impending ASAM arrangement to resolve, quite apart from the market access issue analyzed earlier. The member states should work toward a regime that allows for carriers bearing a trans-ASEAN ownership structure to be recognized automatically, instead of at the discretion of each individual member state. As noted above, member states can always retain the traditional national ownership and control restrictions for their own designated carriers. This aspect of sovereignty will thus not be compromised.
As mentioned earlier, there are ASEAN states like the Philippines whose domestic laws prevent airline companies from being owned beyond a certain proportion by foreign interests (40% in this case). For such states, an ''opt-out'' clause applicable to their own carriers would suffice to ensure compliance with domestic laws, while allowing for fellow ASEAN states' airlines to be set up as "community carriers" (CAPA Consulting, 2008) . Another possible compromise could be to allow majority ownership to be constituted in a trans-ASEAN manner, but to retain effective economic control strictly with the nationals of the designating state. This will provide the assurance of close and continuing economic links between the carrier and its designating state.
On its part, the third alternative formulation in MAAS Article 3(2)(a) (iii) envisages that a carrier need not even have substantial ownership and effective economic control reposed within the region (nor by implication, its designating state), as long as it is incorporated in and has its principal place of business in the designating state. That state must also have and maintain effective regulatory control over the airline. Hence, this is the most progressive of the three alternative options.
It opens up the intriguing possibility that an airline in ASEAN could be owned and economically controlled by interests from outside the region.
However, this possibility comes with two major qualifications. One is the requirement that each contracting party receiving the airline's application must approve its operations. The shortcomings of such a discretionary requirement have been noted above. The other condition relates to the requirement that the arrangement will not be equivalent to allowing airlines or its subsidiaries access to traffic rights not otherwise available to them. This appears to reflect a concern that foreign airlines from outside the region must not be allowed to buy into an ASEAN carrier and begin using it to access intra-ASEAN routes for which they (the foreign airlines) have no underlying rights. In effect, Article 3(2)(a)(iii) will largely end up facilitating investment by foreign non-airline interests only.
An Emerging "Threat": The New ASEAN-China Air Transport Agreement
For now, MAAS and MAFLPAS are the "high points" of air services liberalization in ASEAN. If and when accepted by all ten member states, both agreements will effectively usher in fully unlimited third, fourth and fifth freedom operations for all ASEAN carriers from their home points to all international points in the region. In reality, however, Indonesia's participation is not certain to happen.
At the same time, the liberalization of seventh freedom and domestic/cabotage operations has not even been contemplated yet, let alone the relaxation of ownership and control rules. Without seventh freedom relaxations, any international operation within ASEAN would still have to begin from and end in the carrier's home points.
In addition, the incomplete relaxation of ownership and control rules (see above discussion) means that ASEAN carriers will, in effect, still need to be owned and controlled by interests in their home states.
The "single" aviation market envisaged by the two agreements is thus an unfinished piece of work and at risk of being "single" only in name. In the long term, this shortcoming will potentially create barriers for ASEAN airlines' competitiveness vis-à-vis airlines from outside the region. In particular, the ramifications of failing to forge full intra-ASEAN liberalization become evident when ASEAN, as a group, enters into deals with countries outside the group. One clear example of this is the landmark ASEAN-China Air Transport Agreement (ATA) adopted in 2010 between the ASEAN states, on the one hand, and China, on the other. In essence, the problem is that the ATA was concluded with China before the ASEAN states achieved internal liberalization of its air services market.
In substance, the ATA and its Protocol 1 provide for unlimited third and fourth freedom access for airlines on both sides, effectively superseding the relevant bilateral agreements that exist between the individual ASEAN state parties and China. Hence, all airlines from the ASEAN state parties -currently Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam -now have unlimited third and fourth freedom access and capacity into points in China, with the exception of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (these were points excluded by the Chinese side). Reciprocally, the Chinese airlines have similar unlimited third and fourth freedom access between China and points in the relevant ASEAN countries that have become parties to the ATA and Protocol 1. 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat.  denotes state party, [ X ] denotes non-state party As Table 5 However, the reality is that there will be long-term systemic disadvantages for the ASEAN carriers. This is because under the ATA's third and fourth freedom regime, these carriers can only operate to the Chinese points from points in their own territory. The Singapore carriers, for instance, can only operate to China from One recalls similar dynamics in the way the European countries were disadvantaged in their multilateral aviation relations with the United States (Tan, 2006) . Indeed, that was the reason why the European Commission brought the E.U.
member states before the European Court of Justice in the 1990's to compel them to establish a common aviation market. The Commission eventually prevailed, and the result today is that that E.U. airlines can operate from any E.U. point to any U.S. point if they want to. Thus, Air France can fly between London Heathrow and the U.S. if it wishes to (and if it can find slots at Heathrow, a separate matter altogether).
Previously, this had been a prohibited "seventh freedom" operation but it is now made possible as the E.U. regards itself as a common market. In other words, all flights between the U.S. and the E.U. are now straightforward third/fourth freedom operations for all airlines from both sides.
For ASEAN, the E.U. lesson is wholly relevant and applicable. The member states must similarly band together before they can take on the likes of bigger, unified markets such as China. In fact, India, Japan and Korea are actively looking to establish new agreements with ASEAN similar to the ASEAN-China ATA. Yet, without having forged a true single market in their own backyard first, the ASEAN countries risk disadvantaging their own carriers in the long term, particularly as the Chinese and Indian airlines improve their networks, service standards and competitiveness.
A "true" single market in this regard must thus include seventh freedom rights, that basic market-enlarging feature that would enable the ASEAN carriers to treat the entire region as a common market. The reality, however, is that there is no body or process in ASEAN similar to the European Commission that can compel member states to place the collective regional interest above their own individual interests.
For that reason, there is a real risk that the ASEAN airlines will end up seriously disadvantaged against their fast-growing competitors.
Meanwhile, ASEAN and China have concluded talks to adopt a second protocol to their ATA that grants unlimited fifth freedom rights. However, the lack of a united stand among the ASEAN countries and China's own wariness of opening up its major cities have resulted in a deal that is likely to be commercially insignificant.
In particular, China's discomfort with an ASEAN carrier (e.g. Singapore Airlines)
conducting fifth freedom operations via China to external points (e.g. in the United
States or Europe) has led it to exclude the three metropolitan centres of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou from the so-called "external fifth freedom" deal.
Instead, Protocol 2 will include only 10 Chinese cities (largely secondary ones)
for the exercise of such fifth freedom rights (see Table 6 below). Even then, there is an upper limit or cap of 14 such weekly flights per country. In turn, the ASEAN countries, apart from Singapore and Brunei, have responded by offering their own secondary points for the deal, subject to the same weekly cap. The small markets between these ASEAN and Chinese secondary points make it highly unlikely that any significant fifth freedom operations will be mounted in the near future. probably not enough of a market to justify linking these cities to the ASEAN secondary cities. In short, Protocol 2 is unlikely to be commercially significant, and is reminiscent of the early ASEAN sub-regional arrangements (MAAS Protocols 1 to 4) involving secondary cities only. 
Air Freight (Cargo) Services
Some mention must be made of the separate but related regime relating to air freight services. As noted above, the early ASEAN documents such as RIATS had also laid down deadlines for liberalizing the air freight sector. This is considered an equally critical component of the regional economic integration effort, given the export-oriented nature of ASEAN economies. 
Conclusion
Despite all the problems and shortcomings faced, ASEAN's hope is that member states will in time recognize that it is in their collective interest to forge a truly single aviation market and a common position for negotiating air services with other countries. This would be entirely in line with the broader ambition to achieve an ASEAN Economic Community. However, even the most optimistic observer will concede that time is not on ASEAN's side. In particular, the ASAM's 2015 deadline seems overly ambitious.
The reality is that progress toward a meaningful ASAM is certain to be slow, with big players like Indonesia continuing to hold out on relatively modest issues like third and fourth freedom passenger rights and even air freight services. The huge disparity in airline sizes and competitiveness within the region is a stark reality, as is the pervasive suspicion toward successful airlines from smaller countries such as In time, Indonesia may find that keeping to limits may no longer make economic sense, and that an unlimited "open skies" regime would be more beneficial for its overall economy.
Second, there is the pressure created by the provincial governments, tourism authorities and business community to allow greater direct access into regional cities.
This may help increase the momentum for more relaxations, particularly if the central government can be convinced that there are bigger benefits for the overall economy with greater liberalization. This has already been seen in the Philippines, and to a lesser extent, in Indonesia. In time, the Indonesian government may come around to recognizing that the national interest of the country is more than the sum of its airlines' narrow interests, and that there are greater benefits for the provinces and the other sectors of the economy that may outweigh the interests of its airlines.
Third, as identified above, there is the pressure created by the agreements with larger countries outside the region such as China. There will conceivably be a "tipping point" when the ASEAN member states realize that the collective regional One example is how AirAsia pioneered the cross-border joint venture/subsidiary model -while still imperfect, it allows the airline to get around the "seventh freedom" prohibition and to operate region-wide from multiple hubs using a common, well-recognized brand. In this way, AirAsia has come as close as it can presently get to being an ASEAN "community carrier".
In conclusion, it is clear that just as cross-border ventures have helped circumvent ownership and control limits, market forces will inevitably force changes as new national and pan-Asian airlines seek to expand their markets. The reality is that liberalization in the marketplace is already happening and pressing forward relentlessly -at times because of, but at other times, in spite of, governments and the agreements they adopt. It is high time that the governments sit up and take notice. 
